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INTRODUCTION

Notice of the motion for default was not given, nor was'a telephone
call made before entry of the default, on the mistaken notion that
an attorney's duty to his client prohibits such exercises in professional courtesy. . . . [C]ounsel's obligation to his client does not
outweigh his duty as an officer of the court. It is the function of
our legal system to resolve controversy on the basis of appropriately presented facts, not tactical proficiency. Time limitations
exist for the sake of efficiency, not as traps for the unwary. Suffice
it to say that in this case a great deal of time and energy has been
wasted for want of a single, simple telephone call that a decade ago
would have been considered the rule rather than the exception.'
Judge Hersey's caustic commentary is indicative of the growing
sentiment among the watchdogs of the legal community that the
extension of professional courtesy between lawyers is a dying tradition.2 Today's litigation is often characterized by verbal abuse
1. Caribbean Agencies, Inc. v. Agri-Export, Inc., 384 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.) (Hersey, J., concurring).
2. See Samborn, Taming the Loose Cannons. Incivility Plaguingthe Nation's Bench and
Bar?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 15, 1990, at 1,col. 3; Hazard, Change Rules to "Civilize" the Profession,
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 13, col. 3; Miner, Do Lawyers Owe Each Other?, Nat'l L.J., Dec.
19, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas recently
characterized the decline of collegiality as "a problem that, though of relatively recent origin,
is so pernicious that it threatens to delay the administration of justice and to place litigation
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between counsel, 3 arguably unprofessional litigation tactics commonly known as "gamesmanship," 4 and disdain for civility within the
judicial process.5 Such behavior raises serious questions that the legal
profession must address. Are lawyers who refuse to treat opposing
counsel with courtesy and respect violating an ethical or legal duty?
Furthermore, should a lawyer accede to a client's demand for professional discourtesy when such action will hinder the truth-finding process? The disappearance of professional courtesy reflects a decrease in
collegiality-the mutual respect among colleagues. Modem legal
practice (if not theory) has increasingly de-emphasized collegiality,
despite the fact that legal ethicists of the past espoused the importance
that a lawyer should place on "the good opinion of his professional
brethren." 6 Although most lawyers are neither interested in marring
their reputations within the field nor oblivious to the expectations of
opposing counsel, today's lawyer often perceives himself to be a
"hired gun" owing foremost allegiance to his client, at the possible
expense of withholding professional courtesies.' A hired gun is not
per se uncollegial or disrespected by his colleagues, but the hired gun
beyond the financial reach of litigants." Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988). The court continued:
With alarming frequency, we find that valuable judicial and attorney time is
consumed in resolving unnecesr.ary contention and sharp practices between
lawyers. Judges and magistrates of this court are required to devote substantial
attention to refereeing abusive litigation tactics that range from benign incivility
to outright obstruction. Our system of justice can ill-afford to devote scarce
resources to supervising matters that do not advance the resolution of the merits
of a case; nor can justice long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs
of litigation are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being prohibitive.
Id.
3. For examples of outrageous trial behavior, see In re Crumpacker, 269 Ind. 630, 383
N.E.2d 36 (1978) (lawyer directed derogatory remarks toward opposing counsel and parties,
and took action on behalf of a client for the sole purpose of harassing and injuring others); In
re Vincenti, 92 N.J. 591, 458 A.2d 1268 (1983) (lawyer accused court of conducting a
kangaroo court and engaging in cronyism, racism, and collusion with the prosecution); In re
McAlevy, 69 N.J. 349, 354 A.2d 289 (1976) (lawyer assaulted opposing counsel during a
conference in judge's chambers). For examples of less severe behavior that resulted in no
reprimand 'and that more closely involved the issue of collegiality, see United States v.
Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 514 (2d Cir. 1986) (prosecutor addressed defense counsel as a
"sleaze"); Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1988) (lawyer charged that opposing
counsel didn't "understand the law," and "should go back to law school [and] learn . . .
English"). See generally Annotation, Attorney's Verbal Abuse of Another Attorney as Basisfor
DisciplinaryAction, 87 A.L.R.3d 351 (1978) (collection of verbal abuse cases).
4. See, e.g., Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Salinas, 750 S.W.2d 32, 34-35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(discovery tactics which frustrate truth-seeking).
5. See, e.g., Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286.
6. E.g.,,G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 75 (5th ed. 1896).
7. See Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 48, 49; Sayler, Rambo
Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 79.
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often disregards professional courtesies with the belief that so doing
will be in his client's best interest.8
This Comment analyzes the value of collegiality in the judicial
process. The discussion begins with the initial premise that the current practice of law often represents a disregard for standards that
legal philosophers once considered mandatory in the ethical practice
of law. 9 The touchstone in such a circumstance is whether the concept of the lawyer as collegial is being devalued in the name of justice,
or whether ignorant and disrespectful lawyers are invading the establishment legal practice to the detriment of justice.' ° The devaluation
of collegiality from its early reign may signal an evolution of the
adversary system that better serves justice, or an unfortunate setback
that the legal community must rectify. I Even if justice is reached,
such a system may nonetheless tarnish the image of the legal

profession. 12
Two major forces control lawyer collegiality: philosophical
guidelines that the lawyer sets for himself and legal guidelines that the
profession provides. Each lawyer's particular philosophical understanding of the adversary system of advocacy may influence his view
of the relative necessity of collegial behavior and may create self8. One justification for the hired gun mentality is that it "proves you love your clients,
they love you and anything short of it compromises them." Sayler, supra note 7, at 79.
9. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286. The Dondi court said:
As judges and former practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of
experience, we judicially know that litigation is conducted today in a manner far
different from years past. Whether the increased size of the bar -has decreased
collegiality or the legal profession has become only a business, or experienced
lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be observed, or
because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of behavior
that forebode ill for our system of justice.

Id.
10. Compare M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9-26 (1975)
("Let justice be done-that is, for my client let justice be done-though the heavens fall. That
is the kind of advocacy that I would want as a client and that I feel bound to provide as an
advocate ....
[T]he heavens do not really have to fall-not unless justice requires that they
do.") with Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 215 (1971) ("[L]awyers who know
how to think but have not learned how to behave are a menace and a liability, not an asset, to
the administration of justice.").
11. See supra note 10.
12. See Sayler, supra note 7, at 81 ("[Hired guns] detractfl from the profession ... and
send[] a terrible message to the public about our profession."). The American Bar Association
(ABA) seems to believe that image has importance apart from the delivery of justice by the
legal system. The ABA Commission on Professionalism recently stated: "The primary
question for this Commission thus becomes what, if anything, can be done to improve both the
reality and the perception of lawyer professionalism." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
PROFESSIONALISM TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 112 F.R.D. 243, 254 (1986) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM].
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imposed duties for and against collegial behavior. Similarly, the codes
of ethics and case law in force where the lawyer practices may impose
legal duties of collegiality. Over the last century, the prevailing philosophies of the legal profession have fluctuated, and the American
Bar Association has passed three codes of ethical conduct. 3 In an
attempt to clarify the competing arguments for and against collegiality, this Comment examines the changing philosophies, the codes, and
a smattering of case law.
Section II of this Comment investigates the role of collegiality in
the practice of law according to classic and modern legal philosophies. Section III traces the history of codes of legal ethics and their
corresponding treatment of collegiality. Section IV focuses on case
law and the judicial response to professional discourtesy between
opposing counsel. Section V considers the value collegiality brings to
the legal profession. The Section questions whether an attorney
should yield to professional courtesy when so doing will undermine
his client's desires or legal position, and further, whether manifestations of fellowship between lawyers are ethically compatible with a
just trial. Section V also illustrates a method that local jurisdictions
are implementing in order to improve civility inside and outside of the
courtroom, facilitate the orderly administration of justice, and
improve the public image of the legal profession. Finally, Section VI
recommends the use of explicit codes of professional courtesy and recognizes that lawyers will improve themselves individually, by striving
to improve the entire profession.
II.

LEGAL MODELS

Although this Comment notices the apparent demise of collegiality within the legal profession, such demise is not necessarily indicative of an inferior judicial process. In fact, it is unclear whether
collegiality promotes or actually hinders justice in the judicial process.
Although the majority of lawyers, legal educators, and lay persons
4
would likely consider justice to be the goal of any judicial process,'
the same majority will argue vigorously over what constitutes justice.
13. See

CANONS

RESPONSIBILITY

OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

(1983);

(1951);

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1989).

14. This is not the view of Professor Alan Dershowitz, who states: "[N]obody really
wants justice. Winning is 'the only thing' to most participants in the criminal justice system
....
A. DERSHOWITZ,
.
THE BEST DEFENSE xvi (1982). Note that Professor Dershowitz
limits his opinion to the criminal sector, which may foster different goals than the civil sector.
See generally Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 91-93 (D. Luban
ed. 1984) (arguing that the goal of criminal defense is protection from overreaching by the
state, while the goal of civil defense is individual justice).

1990]

LAWYER COLLEGIALITY

Consequently, the changing notions of justice among lawyers in this
country may actually explain a systematic, yet honorable depreciation
of the value of collegial behavior.' 5 In order to provide a framework
for such an argument, this Section develops simplified models of nineteenth century "classic" advocacy and modern advocacy, which differ
fundamentally in their perceptions of justice.
A.

Classic Philosophy

Early writers on legal ethics agreed that collegiality among members of the bar was an essential element of the health of the individual
lawyer and of the profession as a whole. 16 In his landmark book, A
Course of Legal Study, David Hoffman wrote:
In all intercourse with my professional brethren, I will be
always courteous. No man's passions shall intimidate me from
asserting fully my own, or my client's rights; and no man's ignorance or folly shall induce me to take any advantage of him; I shall
deal with them all as honorable men, ministering at our common
altar. 17
Another early writer, George Sharswood, s whose work would
become a foundation for the original ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics,' 9 believed that a lawyer's sound relationship with other members of the bar was a key element of a successful practice. He wrote
that "[a] very great part of a man's comfort, as well as of his success
15. Of course, one school of thought equates the demise of collegiality with the general
deterioration of lawyers' values due to changing demographic and economic realities or, even
worse, due to avarice and selfishness on the part of lawyers. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 12, at 251-61.
16. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
17. D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752 (W. Hein & Co. 1968) (2d. ed. 1836).
Hoffman (1784-1854) is the father of American legal ethics. T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL
ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics 59 (1985). He was a successful
Baltimore lawyer and a legal educator. Id. He developed the first systematic course for the

study of law and wrote the first statement of professional ethics for American lawyers. Id. His
second edition of A Course of Legal Study contained "Fifty Resolutions in Regard to
Professional Deportment," which preceded the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics by more

than 70 years. Id.; see also Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1064
(1978).
18. Sharswood (1810-1883) was a Philadelphia lawyer, a state legislator, a Pennsylvania

Supreme Court Judge, a legal educator, and a writer. His work, An Essay on Professional
Ethics, found its original form in a group of lectures given to law students at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1854. G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6 (biographical information taken from the
memorial that precedes the text of the book).
19. The first code of ethics was adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association on
December 14, 1887, nine years after the formation of the ABA. Armstrong, supra note 17, at

1063. Thomas Goode Jones, judge and governor, wrote the code based on Sharswood's
lectures, and provided excellent source material for the drafting of the original ABA Canons.
Id. at 1063-64.
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at the Bar, depends upon his relations with his professional
brethren."20
Such statements reflect the nineteenth century prototype of advocacy. This classic model, the usefulness of which this Comment
examines, rests on the principle that all lawyers are "practicing" their
profession, that is, performing to the best ability that their knowledge
and experience provides. Thus, in the courtroom, one lawyer is not
trying to defeat another lawyer. Rather, one litigant is trying to best
another, and each requires the services of a lawyer to adequately present his legal and factual position. It is therefore erroneous under the
classic model to portray a lawyer as winning a case. A lawyer does
not win a case; a client does. As such, a lawyer's central concern is to
ensure that his client's position is expressed in the most favorable disposition that the facts allow-a concern that overshadows any of the
lawyer's personal aspirations of winning the case.21
In the classic scenario, truth is a prerequisite for justice. In such
a world, the goal of judicial proceedings is to produce the most accurate depiction of the dispute that is possible, the foundation of wise
and informed decisionmaking. 22 The lawyer's role, therefore, is to
present the evidence and its most favorable interpretation so that an
impartial trier of fact can apply the law to the most accurate set of
available facts, with the least amount of prejudice.23 In encouraging
true and accurate results, the lawyer must present substantive evidence relevant to the dispute. As such, the model precludes gamesmanship, in which a lawyer uses the judicial process (which is
conceptually intended to be orderly in every way) to harass, annoy,
surprise, or otherwise have the case determined on nonsubstantive
issues. Gamesmanship or sharp practice may avoid the truth directly,
by insisting upon technicalities, or indirectly, by taxing the opposition's limited resources and forcing a less than optimal defense.
20. G.

SHARSWOOD,

supra note 6, at 73. Sharswood actually "told his students that they

would not go wrong if they sought the approval of their professional elders in everything." T.
supra note 17, at xxvi.
21. Justice David D. Peck stated:

SHAFFER,

The object of the lawsuit is to get at the truth and arrive at the right result.
That is the sole objective of the judge, and counsel should never lose sight of that

objective in thinking that the end purpose is to win for his side. Counsel
exclusively bent on winning may find that he and the umpire are not in the same
game.

D.

PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND COUNSEL

9 (1954).

22. John Noonan is among many who have argued that the purpose of a trial is to search
for truth. See Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1485, 1491 (1966); see also Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and
ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 34-36.
23. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 9.
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Under the classic model, a case should be decided by the issues that

arise outside of and prior to the litigation, rather than by justice-compromising antics that occur within the litigation.
This classic model of advocacy encourages collegiality in the
courtroom by recognizing that a lawyer has a duty of loyalty not only

to his client, but also to himself and to the court.24 Because a lawyer's
loyalties are divided among the selfish interests of his client, the justice-seeking interests of the court, and the morality of the lawyer himself, the lawyer is not absolutely bound to follow truth-obfuscating
instructions given by his client. As noted by David Hoffman:
Should my client be disposed to insist on captious requisitions,
or frivolous and vexatious defenses, they shall be neither enforced
nor countenanced by me. And if still adhered to by him from a
hope of pressing the other party into an unjust compromise, or
with any other motive, he shall have the option to elect other
counsel.25

In other words, the lawyer's duty to advance his client's interests
must be subordinated to the ultimate goal of truth-seeking which
brought the relationship into being.26 In short, although the lawyer
must be loyal to his client, he must be equally loyal to himself and to
his position as an officer of the court, a position in which he must
promote the orderly administration of justice and maintain the credibility of the judicial system.27
The lawyer's divided loyalties allow him to behave in a collegial
manner when doing so will not jeopardize his client's right to a just
trial. As a result, a lawyer may forgive the superficial mistakes of the
opposing counsel-a professional colleague. As Sharswood stated:
24. The classic model is by no means dead. In 1986, the Committee on Professionalism
stated: "The Bar should place increasing emphasis on the role of lawyers as officers of the
court, or more broadly, as officers of the system of justice." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 12, at 278.
25. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 754, quoted in G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION

216 (2d ed. 1988). Judge Sharswood also

remarked on these responsibilities of a lawyer: "Let him ... in plain cases not shelter himself
behind the instructions of his client. The client has no right to require him to be illiberal-and
he should throw up his brief sooner than do what revolts against his own sense of what is
demanded by honor and propriety." G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 74-75.
26. Noonan, supra note 22, at 1487; see also Simon, supra note 22, at 35.
27. Note that this is a hybrid description of the lawyer's motivations wrought from those
who support the classic model of truth-seeking. Hoffman valued truth-seeking as a
consequence of his view that the lawyer should never act immorally. Bloomfield, David
Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REv. 673, 687 (1979)
("Hoffman referred all problems to the practitioner's conscience-that mirror of universal
morality .... "). On the other hand, Noonan's position is more institutional. According to
Noonan, the function of the judicial process is not so much to reach morally sound results as it
is merely to reach the truth. Noonan, supra note 22, at 1485-88.
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"Let him [the lawyer] shun most carefully the reputation of a sharp
practitioner. Let him be liberal to the slips and oversights of his
opponent whenever he can do so .... "28
B.

Modern Philosophy

In its simplest form, the modern model of advocacy is similar to
the classic model, except that the lawyer now perceives his divided
duties as weighing more heavily on the side of the client. 29 Consequently, because the client usually is more interested in winning his
case than reaching the truth, so too is the lawyer. Less honorable
litigants who seek to hinder truth-finding or to tax an opponent's
resources have good reason to believe that professional courtesy may
not be in their best interests. Thus, lawyers who place most of their
emphasis on winning instead of on truth-seeking may consciously or
unconsciously avoid collegial behavior.
Those who support the modern model justify its existence by
defining justice as something other than a search for truth. 0 In contrast to the classic model, the modem model can be best explained as
relying on "procedural justice. '3 1 The concept of procedural justice
assumes that moral issues encountered in the classic model are separate from the issue of whether the judicial process is just. 32 Abandoning the moral issues may free a lawyer from self-imposed duties
that prohibit him from engaging in a variety of discourteous and
uncollegial behaviors.3 3 William Simon recognized one view of procedural justice in terms of a "game analogy":
28. G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 74-75; see also supra note 20.
29. It is accepted dogma within the legal profession.., that a lawyer should pursue
his client's interests as vigorously as possible within the limits of the law. This
means that he should not interpose his own moral opinion of those objectives of
his client that are legal. He should not block on moral grounds any attempt by
his client to exercise legal rights; nor should he refrain from using the most
effective legal means to realize these rights and objectives.
A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 90 (1980).

30. See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1035
(1975). Frankel laments: "The advocate in the trial courtroom is not engaged much more
than half the time-and only then coincidentally-in the search for truth. The advocate's
prime loyalty is to his client, not to the truth as such." Id.
31. See Simon, supra note 22, at 38.
32. Id. According to Simon, procedural justice "refer[s] to the notion that there is an
inherent value or legitimacy to the judicial proceeding ... which makes it possible for a lawyer
to justify specific actions without reference to the consequences they are likely to promote."
Id.
33. David Luban also makes this point clear: "If advocates restrain their zeal because of
moral compunctions, they are not fulfilling their assigned role in the adversary proceeding ....
Therefore . . . the structure of adversary adjudication must relieve them of moral
accountability." Luban, supra note 14, at 90.
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The game analogy rationalizes the contradictions between
substance and procedure. The game is a social phenomenon in
which the satisfactory quality of the outcome depends almost
entirely on the proper implementation of procedures. People usually feel that when the rules are followed the outcome of a game is
just, precisely because the rules have been followed. They usually
are not inclined to assess the outcomes in terms of an independent
set of criteria.34
Although Professor Simon makes clear that justice in the game
analogy is achieved "precisely because the rules have been followed," 3 5 it is possible to substantiate the theory of procedural justice.
Dean Monroe Freedman rests his support for procedural justice upon
the maintenance of client autonomy and confidentiality.3 6 To explain
his argument, Dean Freedman envisions a situation in which the client would have his lawyer discredit an adverse witness whom both
know to be telling the truth.3 7 Dean Freedman argues that although
the lawyer might argue with his client about the morality of such an
attempt to discredit, the lawyer must ultimately bow to his client's
will.38 Otherwise, a client who believes that his lawyer will refuse to
mislead the trier of fact will be likely to withhold information necessary to the attorney-client relationship in order to convince his lawyer
that actions in his interest will not be misleading.3 9 Clearly, the client
is not in a position to determine when it is in his best interest to conceal or falsify information; moreover, the lawyer must know all the
facts in order to present the best possible defense. Thus, the lawyer
must have the confidence of his client, and the only way to achieve
this is to assure the client that he will not be prejudiced by telling his
lawyer the truth. 4° Ultimately, the justice of the procedure, rather
34. Simon, supra note 22, at 104. Simon refers to this school of thought as "ritualist"
advocacy because the justice of the process is found within the ritual of the procedure itself:
"It [the ritualism] involves a faith in the immanent rationality of the world as it is ....
Id. at
92.
35. Id. at 104.
36. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer. The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (1966).
37. Id. at 1474.
38. Id. at 1475, 1478; see also Simon, supra note 22, at 34-35.
39. Freedman, supra note 36, at 1474.
40. Id.; see also Simon, supra note 22, at 34-36 (analyzing Freedman's position). Simon
might categorize this as "purposivist" advocacy: "In the Purposivist view, society is populated
. . . by people held together by shared experiences and norms. The purpose of the law is not
just to maintain order, but also to coordinate the actions of citizens so as to further their
common purposes as effectively as possible." Id. at 62. Simon points out that purposivists
'generally subscribe to the "morality of the long run," which "dictates that present sacrifices be
suffered when they make possible greater future benefits," and which "prescribes that social
norms be violated in particular instances as a means to the general welfare." Id. at 73.
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than the morality of the outcome, must prevail."
Because procedural justice assumes that whatever the system
provides is justice, the lawyer is allowed--or perhaps obligated-to
play the role of a hired gun, carrying out his client's will within legal

limits to the possible detriment of the truth or accuracy of the proceedings.4 2 Furthermore, because the procedures themselves are
assuring that justice is done, a lawyer is more inclined to take advantage of every procedural edge that may be gained.4 3 A lawyer today
would likely categorize such behavior under the heading of zealous
advocacy, 44 a concept inspired many years ago in Lord Brougham's
surprisingly "modern" instructions:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one
person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that
client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to
other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm,
the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
41. But see Luban, supra note 14, at 91 (suggesting that Freedman's view is only valid for
criminal defense because it "inflicts no harm on anyone when a criminal evades punishment");
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975) ("Once
we leave the peculiar situation of the criminal defense lawyer, I think it quite likely that the
role-differentiated amorality of the lawyer is almost certainly excessive and at times
inappropriate.").
42. See Frankel, supra note 30, at 1036-39. Frankel remarks:
[E]thical standards governing counsel command loyalty and zeal for the client,
but no positive obligation at all to the truth. Counsel must not knowingly break
the law or commit or countenance fraud. Within these unconfining limits,
advocates freely employ time-honored tricks and stratagems to block or distort
the truth.
Id. at 1038.

43. See M.

FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE

17-18 (1980). Frankel states:

Every idea for improved procedures must be imaginatively pretested to foresee its
evolving shapes under the fires of adversary zeal.
Because the route of a lawsuit is marked by a running battle all the way, the
outcome is nothing like the assuredly right result imagined in our dream that
"justice will out." . .. Where skill and trickery are so much involved, it must
inevitably happen that the respective qualities of the professional champions will
make a decisive difference.
Id.
44. This idea is reflected in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility:
The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law .... The professional responsibility
of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of
assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and
benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society
is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law;
to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for
adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 7-1 (1983).
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Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must
go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy
fate to involve his country in confusion.4 5

If lawyers were given discretion to back away from zealous advocacy,
they would have to prejudge each case, and essentially usurp the judicial function.46 Thus, justice is obtained by the zealous advocate
through the idea that within just procedural guidelines, a judge and
lawyer do not share a common purpose, and are not allied in any
way.4 7 As such, any legal road not taken by a lawyer is a disservice to
the client and to the system.
Although the modem model of procedural justice leaves less
room for collegiality, even this model would appear to allow for basic
professional courtesies some of the time. Conversely, many of today's
lawyers who might attempt to "be liberal to the slips and oversights of
his opponents" 48 might fear a malpractice suit for doing so.49 The
reality of today's advocacy is that gamesmanship or "hardball" is
increasingly expected by lawyers and presumably demanded by clients.50 So-called "Rambo litigation" is pervading the courtroom. 5
45. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (J. Cockroft & Co. ed. 1874), cited in Frankel, supra
note 30, at 1036. Frankel notes that "[n]either the sentiment nor even the words [of Lord
Brougham] sound archaic after a century and a half." Id.
46. Luban, supra note 14, at 100.
47. See Frankel, supra note 30, at 1035.
48. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
49. See Caribbean Agencies, Inc. v. Agri-Export, Inc., 384 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883, 893-94 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
50. See Goldberg, supra note 7. Goldberg provides examples of the proliferation of
"hardball litigation," but he avoids addressing its origins. He implies that clients want
"hardball," but he provides no supporting data. Id. at 48. Goldberg interviewed Philip
Corboy, a plaintiff's lawyer who provided the following definition: "'Hardball is when a
lawyer, whether plaintiff's or defense, is personally antagonistic or insistent on all the
procedural rules being followed.' " Id.
51. See Sayler, supra note 7. Sayler defined "Rambo litigation" by listing its characteristics:
1. A mindset that litigation is war and that describes trial practice in
military terms.
2. A conviction that it is invariably in your interest to make life miserable
for your opponent.
3. A disdain for common courtesy and civility, assuming that they ill-befit
the true warrior.
4. A wondrous facility for manipulating facts and engaging in revisionist
history.
5. A hair-trigger willingness to fire off unnecessary motions and to use
discovery for intimidation rather than fact-finding.
6. An urge to put the trial lawyer on center stage rather than the client or
his cause.
Id. at 79. Sayler further argued that "Rambo litigation" is "bad advocacy" that "detracts
from the profession." Id. at 80-81.
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Collegiality has not died, but it appears to have been devalued in the
modern model. The following Sections of this Comment will focus on
this change and evaluate its implications.
III.

CODES OF ETHICS

Section I of this Comment focused on perceived obligations or
limitations of collegial behavior that are essentially ethical in nature
and internal in application. These perceived obligations develop from
each lawyer's unique notion of ethics within the legal profession. For
example, a lawyer who believes that the trial should be a search for
the truth will prefer collegiality over a strict "hired gun" approach.
Such intrinsic values unique to individual attorneys operate independently of any set of external rules that the legal profession as a whole
may have promulgated. Nonetheless, the external rules-the codes of
ethics developed by the American Bar Association and implemented
by state and county authorities-have a practical significance over
and above a lawyer's personal definition of ethics.52 These codes provide a barometer of the prevailing ethical views of the legal community, and once the judiciary or the legislature adopts one of these
53
codes, violators are subject to reprimand, suspension, or disbarment.
Thus, the legal profession should be able to promote collegiality or
any other desired behavior through the implementation of codes.
In all of the codes, however, the provisions explaining a lawyer's
duty to extend professional courtesies to opposing counsel are written
with a vagueness that undermines their practical enforceability. 4
Interestingly, the treatment of collegiality in the codes has decreased
over time while the current outcry for collegiality in the courtroom
may be at its highest.55 In examining this trend, the following Section
of this Comment will track the legal profession's treatment of collegiality in the American Bar Association's three codes: the 1908 Canons
of Professional Ethics (Canons), the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), and the 1983 Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Rules).
The original 1908 Canons represent the spirit of the classic
52. "[C]odes of ethics are a primary instrument for attaining.., the dominant goals of any
occupation: objective achievement and recognition. Codified standards can generate
monetary and psychic benefits by enhancing occupational status and self-image; constraining
competition; preserving autonomy; and reconciling client, colleague, and institutional
interests." Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers.: A FunctionalPerspective on ProfessionalCodes, 59
TEX. L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1981).
53. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.5, at 117-18 (1986).
54. See infra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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model of advocacy, 56 speaking exclusively in aspirational rather than
black-letter terms. Each of the thirty-two canons are followed by one
or more paragraphs of lofty description. The Canons demand little,
but they do provide guidelines which describe what a lawyer "should"
do.57 Canons 17 and 25 particularly urge collegial behavior.58 Canon
17 warns that "[a]ll personalities between counsel" and "[p]ersonal
colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly
wrangling" should be scrupulously avoided.59 Canon 25 reflects the
idea that it is unethical to take advantage of opposing counsel by insistence upon a technicality, "even when the law permits."' Today,
however, the perceived ethical fortitude of this canon appears to have
56. The classic model portrays a lawyer whose loyalties are divided among himself, the
court, and the client. Such a division improves the acceptability of collegial behavior among
lawyers. See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text. Canon 15, entitled "How Far a
Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client's Cause," affirmed that a lawyer should not be a slave
to his client's goals:
The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability.... But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The
office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client
... any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1951) (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 13 (1951) (A contract for a
contingent fee "should be reasonable."); id. at Canon 17 (Ill feeling between clients "should
not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other."); id. at
Canon 18 ("A' lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness .... );
id. at Canon 22 ("The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other lawyers should
be characterized by candor and fairness.").
58. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
59. The full text of Canon 17 is as follows:
ILL FEELING AND PERSONALITIES BETWEEN ADVOCATES. Clients, not
lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between
clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and
demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities
between counsel should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a cause it is
indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal peculiarities and
idiosyncrasies of counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies between counsel
which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully
avoided.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 17 (1951).
60. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Canon 25 reads in full:
TAKING TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE OF OPPOSITE COUNSEL; AGREEMENTS WITH

HIM. A lawyer should not ignore known customs or practice of the Bar or of a
particular Court, even when the law permits, without giving timely notice to the
opposing counsel. As far as possible, important agreements, affecting the rights
of clients, should be reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to avoid
performance of an agreement fairly made because it is not reduced to writing, as
required by rules of Court.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 25 (1951).
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eroded significantly6 ' in light of the proliferation of hired guns who
will relentlessly press a technical advantage in the courtroom. 62 The
Canons reflected the Bar's desire to maintain honor within the profession, but the lofty language of the Canons was a poor practical guide
which proved difficult to enforce.6 3
If the Bar was to rid itself of lawyers who abused the court system, the profession would require more precise statements of standards and disciplinary procedures.6 4 Thus, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in
1969, and most states followed suit shortly thereafter. 65 The Code is
divided into nine Canons, each overseeing Ethical Considerations
(EC's), and Disciplinary Rules (DR's). The nine Canons are "axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional
conduct expected of lawyers."' 66 The Ethical Considerations retain
much of the lofty language of the original Canons, and they proclaim
themselves to be "aspirational in character. ' 67 Unlike the original
canons, however, the Disciplinary Rules are "mandatory in character" and state "the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer
'68
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."
The Ethical Considerations are extensive, alone comprising more
61. The Canons served as the only ethical code for lawyers from 1908 until the adoption of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969. Contrary ethical views, however, may have
prevailed for quite some time before the legal community responded. For example, as early as
1935, the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics noted that the Canons no longer represented
the prevailing opinions of American lawyers, particularly in the areas of advertising and law
listings. Armstrong, supra note 17, at 1068. Nonetheless, committees reported as late as 1958
that no changes in the Canons were necessary. Id. at 1069.
62. Judge Walter Schaefer complained:
The system has so changed that what we are doing in the courtroom is
trying the conduct of the police and that of the prosecutor all along the line. Has
there been a misstep at this point? at that point? You know very well that the
man is guilty; there is no doubt about the proof. But you must ask, for example:
Was there something technically wrong with the arrest? You're always trying
something irrelevant. The case is determined on something that really has
nothing to do with guilt or innocence.
Frankel, supra note 30, at 1037 n. 16 (remarks of Judge Walter V. Schaefer).
63. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1983). "There was no
organized interrelationship between the Canons and they often overlapped. They were not
cast in language designed for disciplinary enforcement and many abounded with quaint
expressions of the past." Id.
64. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 12, at 258;
Armstrong, supra note 17, at 1069.
65. T. SHAFFER, supra note 17, at app. I-1. Because the ABA is a voluntary association of
lawyers, it has no governmental status, and its codes have legal effect only when a state
legislature or court adopts them. Id. at app. 1-2.
66. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1983).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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material than the original Canons. They reflect significant concern
for collegiality,6 9 and notably, EC 7-38 provides an explicit request for
collegial behavior among members of the profession:
A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should
accede to reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural formalities, and similar
matters which do not prejudice the rights of the client. He should
follow local customs of courtesy and practice, unless he gives
70
timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention not to do so.
This provision urges opposing lawyers to de-emphasize non-substantive or technical issues, ostensibly to promote an accurate depiction of the dispute and a just outcome. Such togetherness on the part
of'opposing counsel is basic to collegiality, but it begins to undermine
the adversary nature of the process. Nonetheless, several other EC's
reinforce EC 7-38 in urging compliance with the tenets of the classic
model, and in emphasizing that a lawyer can be collegial with his
opponents without necessarily abrogating duties owed to his clients. 7 '
The few disciplinary proceedings which involved violations of EC's
demonstrate, however, that the enforceability of the EC's is limited.72
In reality, the only enforceable provisions of the Code are the Disciplinary Rules, which are considerably less concerned with collegial-

ity. 73 Ultimately, the Ethical Considerations embody a wealth of
classic and honorable legal principles which remain unenforceable.

69. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1983). Also relevant is
EC 7-37, which states: "In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling
may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct,
attitude, and demeanor towards opposing lawyers." Id. at EC 7-37.
71. See, e.g., id. at EC 7-10 (A lawyer's zealous representation does not militate against the
concurrent obligation to treat all persons involved in the legal process with consideration.); id.
at EC 7-23 (A lawyer has a duty to inform the judge of adverse legal authority.); id. at EC 7-36
(Zealous advocacy does not allow a lawyer to offend the dignity and decorum of court
proceedings.); id. at EC 7-37 (Ill feeling between clients should not influence a lawyer's
demeanor towards other lawyers.).
72. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 53, § 2.6, at 59 (" '[A]spirational' as used in the Code
means 'recommended but not required.' . . . Most jurisdictions have used the EC's in this
nonbinding way."); see also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 128 (The violation of EC's "is
not intended to result in disciplinary action."). But see Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Iowa 1979) ("[V]iolation of an ethical consideration, standing
alone, will support disciplinary action.); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 53, at 59 & n.60 (noting
that courts in Iowa, Colorado, Kentucky, New York, and South Dakota have enforced EC's).
73. DR 7-106(C)(5) mandates that a lawyer appearing in his professional capacity before a
tribunal shall not "[flail to comply with known local customs or courtesy or practice of the bar
or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of his intent not to
comply." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(5) (1983). It is
intriguing that being uncollegial in this context is allowable, as long as the lawyer first gives
notice to his opposing counsel.
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Because the Code failed to adequately address a number of
issues, many legal practitioners soon considered the Code to be ineffective.74 According to one commentator, "the disparity between
what [the Code's] Ethical Considerations exhorted and what its Disciplinary Rules required was fostering cynicism about the bar's aspirational norms and creating confusion in enforcement efforts."' 75 The
Code thus gave way to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which a divided board of ABA delegates ratified in 1983.76 The
Model Rules consist of fifty-two black letter rules followed by explanatory commentary, a structure that parallels that of the American
Law Institute's Restatements of the Law. The Rules attempt to draw
a bright line below which a lawyer's conduct may not fall, and they all
but abandon the aspirational character of the Code. The ratification
of the Model Rules generated a great deal of controversy over the
substance of the document and the deletion of the aspirational language.7 7 Several states, some of which had only recently adopted the
Code, chose not to adopt the Rules.78
The move to the Model Rules was intended to improve the
enforceability of ethical mandates, yet the Rules have the concurrent
effect of setting minimum standards that de-emphasize the desire for a
standard of conduct above such minimums. 79 The Rules demand little in the area of collegiality, and no rule is explicit on the topic. Rule
3.5(c) states that a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal, 8 0 and Rule 3.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from making
a frivolous discovery request or failing to make a "reasonably diligent
74. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 53, § 2.6, at 60. Wolfram emphasizes three aspects of
the Code that troubled lawyers. First, the Code needed to be clearer and more responsive to
"modern practice realities," particularly in the areas of advertising and solicitation. Id.

Second, the Code was inadequate to address the problems of nonlitigation practice. Id.
Finally, the Code was deficient in providing helpful guidance to the full spectrum of the legal
community, such as solo practitioners in economically marginal practices. Id.
75. G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, supra note 25, at 100.
76. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 53, § 2.6, at 62.

77. Id.
78. For example, Colorado has not yet adopted the rules, citing as one area of concern the

abolition of the ethical considerations. Recent Developments, State Adoption ofAmerican Bar
Association ModelRules, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327 (1988). Illinois, which at present is not
considering the adoption of the Model Rules, only recently adopted the Model Code in 1980.
Id. at 327-28 (1988). Other states that have not adopted the Rules include New York,

Vermont, and California. Id. at 329, 331, 339.
79. In the opinion of the Commission on Professionalism, lawyers tend to look at nothing
but the rules: "If conduct meets the minimum standard, lawyers tend to ignore exhortations
to set their standards at a higher level." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,
supra note 9, at 259.
80. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (1989). The commentary states

that "[r]efraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to
speak on behalf of litigants." Id. at Rule 3.5 comment.
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effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request."'" The only
affirmative statements addressing collegiality exist in the Preamble:
"A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for
those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials .... [A] lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the

approbation of professional peers."8 2 The Preamble, however, is
equally as unenforceable as aspirational language in other codes.
When reading any of the three codes, it seems clear that their
authors would gladly approve of collegial behavior from all members
of the bar. Nonetheless, provisions that encourage collegiality have
historically been difficult to enforce.8 3 Whether the Code's Ethical
Considerations are merely aspirational, or the Rules are inapplicable,
the results are the same: The ABA has yet to create a duty that
demands professional courtesy between opposing counsel. The lawyer's duty to his client is emphasized in the Canons, the Code, and the
Rules, but the lawyer's obligations to opposing counsel (an offshoot of
his personal morals and his role as an officer of the court) have
declined in their prominence in the codes.8 4 That the codes do not
demand collegiality is consistent with the inherent conflict between
the philosophies of advocacy. Collegial behavior-professional courtesy-is difficult to categorize as anything other than optional behavior, particularly when being collegial is contrary to a client's best
interest. This is not to say that the ABA has conceded that the lawyer's duty to his client outweighs his duty to the court. It may simply
mean that the difficulties inherent in attempting to enforce duties of
professional courtesy determine that such duties should not be
included in the bright-line rules. Conversely, the lawyer's duty of
utmost loyalty to his client reaches the heart of the advocate's duties,
and must be included in any code. 5 Thus, the decreasing emphasis
on collegiality reflected in the Model Rules may represent a necessary
sacrifice in the implementation of an enforceable document, rather
than a declaration that discourteous hired guns are favored.
81. Id. at Rule 3.4.
82. Id. at Preamble.
83. See supra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
84. The black letter quality of the Model Rules is an attestation to the fact that fringe
obligations like courtesy are no longer high on the ABA's agenda insofar as inclusion in a code

is concerned. In fact, "the American bar's history of codification reflects diminishing interest
in ethical aspirations and a greater reliance on minimum prohibitions." G. HAZARD & D.
RHODE, supra note 25, at 93 (citing Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 953).
85. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.2 (1989) ("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ....").
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THE CASES

Case law provides the final block of background information that
should be reviewed prior to an exploration of the actual value that
collegiality may bring to the legal profession. This Section presents
case law in which either the lack of professional courtesy influenced

the outcome of a case or a judge felt compelled to address the issue of
professional courtesy in a written opinion. The cases that bear close
examination concern situations in which a lawyer's perceived duties
to his client clash with opportunities to extend professional courtesies.86 This Section examines such cases in the areas of default judgments and time extensions.
The law of default judgments is rich with debate concerning professional courtesy. 7 Before a lawyer elects to move for a default judgment, he may choose to notify opposing counsel of his intent to do so.
Similarly, after the court enters a default judgment, the lawyer may
choose to notify opposing counsel. In either case, some lawyers consider notice to the defaulting side to be a common courtesy which
should be extended in this inherently ex parte procedure. 88 A lawyer
who is absolutely loyal to his client, however, may perceive a conflict
in extending this courtesy. For example, suppose local law provides
that the default cannot be challenged after a certain time period.
Although the merits of the case remain untried, a party could conceivably win a case by obtaining a default that remains uncontested
beyond the expiration of the statutory time limit. If the lawyer were
never to notify opposing counsel of the default, opposing counsel
might fail to learn of the default until after the statutory time limit
had expired. Such uncollegial behavior may indeed serve the ultimate
goals of the client.8 9
86. See infra notes 87 & 121 and accompanying text. In contrast, the less relevant cases
concern, for example, verbal abuse of opposing counsel. Most instances of verbal abuse
concern lawyers who are not so much emphasizing their loyalty to the client as being impolite.
See supra note 3.
87. See, e.g., Belim v. Bellia, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1036, 1038, 198 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390 (1984);
Caribbean Agencies, Inc. v. Agri-Export, Inc., 384 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Resto v. Walker, 66 Ill. App. 3d 733, 741, 383 N.E.2d 1361, 1367 (1978); George F. Mueller &
Sons, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 19 Ill. App. 3d 973, 978-79, 313 N.E.2d 684, 688-89 (1974); Sprung v.
Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883, 892-95 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Burke v. Rachau, 262
Or. 323, 334-42, 497 P.2d 1154, 1159-62 (1972); Hardware Wholesalers, Inc. v. Swope, 309 Pa.
Super. 321, 325-30, 455 A.2d 180, 182-84 (1983); Ashton v. Ashton, 257 Pa. Super. 134, 13840, 390 A.2d 282, 284-85 (1978); Silverman v. Polis, 230 Pa. Super. 366, 370-71, 326 A.2d 452,
454-55 (1975); see also supra note I and accompanying text.
88. See supra note I and accompanying text.
89. The extension of the courtesy is particularly important when the lawyer for the
defaulting party has a valid excuse for not attending the trial or for not learning of the
subsequent default. If, however, the lawyer's negligence contributed to the default, then the
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This example demonstrates the tension between the enforcement
of technical rules and the desirability of a trial on the merits. In the
classic realm of truth-seeking, to take a default is not honorable under
most circumstances, particularly when notice is not provided to the
opposing side. 90 For the most part, the refusal to extend the courtesy
of notification is a significant factor in deciding to open a default judgment. 9' In the 1974 case of Silverman v. PoliS, 92 the court vacated
such a default judgment, citing EC 7-38 and DR 7-106(C)(5). 93 The

majority's opinion concluded with the following admonition:
[1]t is patently obvious that attempts to utilize every niggling
procedural point for maximum advantage demean the legal profession, reducing its procedures to a vulgar scramble. No doubt it is
for this reason that in so many cases, notice of intent to take a
default judgment, or the lack thereof, is properly made a significant
factor in reaching a just decision.94
The court's reasoning in one sense was simply that legal proceedings
are meant to argue the facts instead of the procedures. Interestingly,
the court not only rested its argument on truth-seeking, but it also
that the practice of not affording notice demeaned the legal
mentioned 95
profession.
Although recent cases recognize the customary courtesy of notifying the opposing side of a default, the lack of notice does not always
command that a default judgment be set aside: 96 "While as a matter
of professional courtesy counsel should have given notice of the
impending default, and we decry this lack of professional courtesy,
...counsel was under no legal obligation to do so." 97 An excellent
example of such modem thinking appears in Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc.,9recently decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In a
judgment might remain in spite of any lack of courtesy on the part of the opposing side. See
Bellm, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
90. Traditionally, it is desirable to have the case decided on the facts that brought it to the
courthouse, not on extraneous technicalities. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Caribbean Agencies, Inc. v. Agri-Export, Inc., 384 So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Resto v. Walker, 66 Ii. App. 3d 733, 383 N.E.2d 1361 (1978); Silverman v. Polis,
230 Pa. Super. 366, 326 A.2d 452 (1974).
92. 230 Pa. Super. 366, 326 A.2d 452 (1974).
93. Id. at 370-71, 326 A.2d at 454. The code provisions cited by the court are the two
provisions in the Model Code that encourage collegiality. See supra notes 53-54 and
accompanying text.
94. Silverman, 230 Pa. Super. at 371, 326 A.2d at 454-55.
95. Id., 326 A.2d at 455. This concern for the image of the legal profession may account
for substantial support for collegial behavior. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Bellm v. Bellia, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1036, 198 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1984); Sprung v.
Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
97. Bellm, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (citation omitted).
98. 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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tort action, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment for $1,500,000
against the defendant.99 At the instruction of his client, the plaintiff's
attorney had waited one month-the duration of the state statutory
period allowed for contesting a default judgment-before he informed
the defendant of the default."0 On appeal, the majority remanded the
case to determine whether the trial court should set aside the default
on equitable grounds.' 0 '
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Sprung wrestled with
the issue of professional courtesy, an issue which had remained
untouched by the majority. °2 The concurrence argued that "to
require an attorney to inform his adversary of a default stands
athwart the attorney's duty to zealously represent his client."' 13 The
concurrence preferred a bright-line rule that "when an attorney is specifically instructed by the client, the attorney must follow these
instructions, if lawful, with reasonable care and promptness, or risk
possible liability for damages proximately caused by the attorney's
failure."''
Philosophically, this stance is in conformity with the
modern model of advocacy, placing greater emphasis on attorney-client loyalties and discouraging any professional courtesies unless the
client agrees.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Donnelly represented the classic
model: "[A] lawyer does not inevitably violate his obligation to seek
the lawful objections of his client when he treats his opposing counsel
with courtesy and consideration."'' 0 5 Consequently, Judge Donnelly
fully agreed with the trial court in setting aside the default, an action
to correct "what must be considered a miscarriage of justice."'0 6 In
contrast to the majority, Judge Donnelly preferred to view the case
not as a dilemma for the lawyer, but as an unfortunate misdeed on the
part of the client who seeks to conceal the default from his opponent.' 7 He posed this question: Had the lawyer "acted as a professional and not as a hired representative who did solely the bidding of
99. Id. at 885.
100. Id. at 885, 893.
101. Id. at 890.

102. It is significant that the majority chose not to decide the courtesy issue. The majority
wrote chiefly about the procedural requirements necessary to open a default judgment,
avoiding (perhaps cleverly) the rather difficult issue of courtesy. Id. at 884-90. By not making
courtesy an issue in the majority opinion, the court left the task of discouraging discourtesy to
the dissenting judge. Id. at 893 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Rendlen, J., concurring).

104. Id.
105. Id. (Donnelly, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge went so far as to admit to being

"somewhat old-fashioned." Id.
106. Id. at 894.
107. Id.
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his client, would/could this Court have protected him?"'

°

Answer-

ing his own question, Judge Donnelly argued that the issue concerns
the equities due the parties, rather than the attorneys. If the plaintiff
demanded concealment by abrogation of professional courtesies, then
equity should favor the defendant. 10 9
In Hardware Wholesalers,Inc. v. Swope, 110 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania considered the case of an attorney who obtained a
default judgment on behalf of his client because the opposing attorney
had failed to answer the complaint in a timely manner. The plaintiff's

lawyer had granted an extension of time to answer, and his opposing
counsel responded in writing: "I would expect to have [the answer]

up to you by next Thursday. If there are any problems with this, let
me know. ' " I I The answer was not filed by the date projected in the
memo, and the lawyer then moved for and received a default judg-

ment on the following Tuesday; he had not attempted to communicate with opposing counsel.' 12 Upon denial of its motion to open the
judgment, the defaulting party appealed." 3 On appeal, the Superior
Court construed the memo against the drafting attorney and refused

to open the judgment, never raising the issue of professional
courtesy. 114
The dissent declared that the majority opinion "rewards discourtesy." 1'5 It argued that construing a writing against its author is only
appropriate when parties are engaged in a bargaining struggle:
But that principle is most inappropriate ... to instill and enforce
the habits of common courtesy between counsel. Counsel discussing a mutually agreeable extension are not adversaries, engaged in
a bargaining struggle. Indeed, the adversary system won't and
can't work.., unless opposing counsel have the maturity and self108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 309 Pa. Super. 321, 455 A.2d 180 (1983).
111. Id. at 323, 455 A.2d at 181.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 323-35, 455 A.2d at 181-82. The local rule provided that if a written agreement

for an extension of time specified a time within which the required action was to be taken and a
default occurred thereafter, default could be entered without notice. Id. at 326, 455 A.2d at
182. The court noted that the extension specified Thursday as a deadline and that the attorney
did not comply with the deadline. Therefore, the court held that default could be entered
without notice. Id. at 325, 455 A.2d at 182.
However, did the writing really specify a time or merely suggest one? In either case, the
attorney who moved for the default could have chosen to communicate with opposing counsel,
purely out of professional courtesy, if he so desired. He readily agreed to the first extension,
but he may have considered a call to the opposing side concerning the violation of the deadline
as undermining his client's right to a default judgment.
115. Id. at 325, 455 A.2d at 182 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
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control to know when they should be adversaries and when they
shouldn't be. 116
The dissent reflects dissatisfaction with the modem movement
toward lawyers battling over rules, rather than clients actively resolving disputes. If a lawyer has no legal duty to inform the opposing
counsel of a default judgment, and such judgment will be sustained on
appeal, the lawyer's only incentive to inform his opposing counsel of a
default is the fortification of his professional reputation as a fair
player. 17
In Hardware Wholesalers, the plaintiff's attorney granted the
opposition an extension of time to answer the complaint." 8 Only
after the defendant's attorney failed to meet his new, self-imposed
deadline did the plaintiff's attorney obtain a default judgment." 9 A
supporter of the modern model of advocacy might argue that by
granting any extension, plaintiff's attorney reduced his client's opportunity to obtain a default judgment or take advantage of a hastily prepared answer. This argument is weakened, however, because default
judgments are not favored and professional courtesy is.' 2 °
What if a time extension effectively denied a litigant the right to
116. Id. at 328, 455 A.2d at 183.
117. The lawyer's desire to maintain a favorable reputation within the legal community
may be a powerful check on professional discourtesy. Sharswood has stated:
Nothing is more certain than that the practitioner will find, in the long run,
the good opinion of his professional brethren of more importance than that of
what is commonly called the public. The foundations of the reputation of every
truly great lawyer will be discovered to have been laid here. Sooner or later, the
real public-the business men of the community, who have important lawsuits,
and are valuable clients-endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his
associates of the Bar ....
The good opinion and confidence of the members of
the same profession, like the King's name on the field of battle, is "a tower of
strength;" it is the title of legitimacy.
G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 75. Sayler provided a current assessment:
Hardball litigation tends to dry up those sources of business generated by
word of mouth. Every time a lawyer handles a case, he is being judged by a
multitude of colleagues. The impressions they form often bear directly on future
business prospects. All of them will be in a position to say, "I have worked with
so-and-so personally and I can vouch that he is a world class jerk," and refer
business accordingly.
Sayler, supra note 7, at 8 1.
118. Hardware Wholesalers, 309 Pa. Super. at 322, 455 A.2d at 181.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391, 397-98 (6th Cir.
1987) ("strong preference for trials on the merits" and "harsh sanction of default"); Ashton v.
Ashton, 257 Pa. Super. 134, 139, 390 A.2d 282, 285 (1978) ("The purpose of the rules in
authorizing the entry of default is to prevent a dilatory defendant from impeding the plaintiff
in establishing his claim. The rules are not primarily intended to provide the plaintiff with a
means of gaining a judgment without the difficulties which arise from litigation." (quoting
Moyer v. Americana Mobile Homes, Inc., 244 Pa. Super. 441,445, 368 A.2d 802, 804 (1976))).
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raise an affirmative defense under the statute of limitations? In SeaLand Service, Inc. v. R. V D'Alfonso Co., 2 ' a freight forwarder
brought an action to recover freight charges. After the plaintiff filed
the complaint, the parties agreed in writing to extend the due date for
the defendant's response."' The defendant then filed an answer and
counterclaim for damages to the goods. 123 The plaintiff then asserted
the statute of limitations, which had expired one week before the
defendant had filed his counterclaim.1 24 The trial court held that the
defendant had failed to meet the burden of showing that the plaintiff
had intended to waive the statute of limitations. The language of the
agreement was chosen by the defendant, and therefore had to be con125
strued against him.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed by a 2-1 margin, founding
its decision on the principles of professional courtesy. 1 2 6 The dissent,
however, considered the agreement to be vague as to the statute of
limitations; it argued that the statute should apply. ' 27 The position of
the dissent in Sea-Land Service is consistent with that of the majority
in Hardware Wholesalers. Attorneys, rather than clients, are envisioned as adversaries, and objection is made to the idea that the
defendant's attorney was "led down the garden path." 128 In the SeaLand Service dissent's view, the defendant's attorney should have
known the law, and he was therefore responsible for preparing for any
of its eventualities in relation to the counterclaim. The dissent
argued:
Why is not defendant's lawyer, who drafted the stipulation, in the
best position to anticipate his own statute of limitations problem
associated with the bringing of what is, in essence, a separate lawbe expected
suit? Why should not he, rather than plaintiff's lawyer
129
to anticipate the issue by appropriate language?
The dissent also argued that once the defense had accrued, the plaintiff's attorney had an ethical obligation to plead the statute of limitations under EC 7-7 of the Model Code, which prohibits a lawyer from
121. 727 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 1-2. The stipulation read: " '[I]t
is hereby stipulated ... that the time within
which defendant may respond to plaintiff's Complaint be extended ......."Id. The uncertainty
in this case concerned whether a "response" refers to an answer, or includes both an answer
and a counterclaim. Id. at 4-5.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id. at 1-2.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 3-4.
127. Id. at 4 (Campbell, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 6.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:807

waiving a client's affirmative defenses. 3 ' Thus, the dissent exhibited
the modem model approach by placing foremost weight on serving
the client loyally. This approach does not favor3 1professional courtesy
if it in any way diminishes a client's position.1
The majority, by contrast, did not consider the plaintiff's lawyer
to have waived any accrued defenses. 32 Looking to the intent of the
statute of limitations, the majority noted that the statute does not
address money owed, but is instead intended as a protection against
stale claims. 33 The court stated: "Had counsel not consented to a
late filing, this claim would have been timely filed. We cannot share
the thought that it would be unethical not to assert a defense that
would never have existed but for counsel's conduct."' 134 The majority
distinguished the situation of waiving an accrued defense as a matter
of courtesy from an extension of a courtesy "when the defense had not
yet accrued, and never would have accrued had the courtesy not been
extended."' 35 The court further noted that its decision did not "substantial[ly] prejudice" any rights, but rather prevented a windfall for
the plaintiff and a loss for the defendant.' 36 The court concluded with
rhetoric directly in line with the principles of the classic model of
advocacy: "Must a lawyer assert technical constructions of what was
extended as a courtesy, when, later, a substantive advantage for his
client is perceived? To do so could well be against a lawyer's personal
137
interest in his reputation with the bar."'
V.

THE VALUE OF COLLEGIALITY

This Comment has explored collegiality by focusing on the inherent conflict between a lawyer's duty of loyalty to his client and a lawyer's moral duty to promote truth and accuracy in legal proceedings.
Proponents of the classic model of advocacy see truth and accuracy as
130. Id. at 5. EC 7-7 reads:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause
or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make
decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is
exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such
decisions are binding on his lawyer. As typical examples in civil cases, it is for
the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer or whether he will
waive his right to plead an affirmative defense.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1983).
131. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
132. Sea-Land Service, 727 F.2d at 3.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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moral imperatives in the judicial process.' 38 Because collegiality acts
as a mechanism for lawyers working together to address legal and
factual issues that are substantive rather than technical, the classic
model equates collegiality with an accurate depiction of the dispute.1 39 Furthermore, because collegiality is compatible with lawyer
self-interest, and this self-interest includes a commitment to justice as
truth-finding, the classic model perceives collegiality as promoting
correct results. Moreover, the cooperation of lawyers with respect to
technical and superficial issues also saves litigants the time and
expense required to argue such issues. Such savings arguably improve
the quality of the representation with regard to the merits because
increased resources are available to the litigants. In the words of a
poetic judge, "justice delayed, and justice obtained at excessive cost, is
often justice denied."'" Thus, according to the classic model of advocacy, collegiality improves the judicial system because more legal proceedings will reach just results at a lower cost.
The discussion of the modem model presented in Section II(B) of
this Comment provides only a small survey of available counterarguments. 14 1 Some commentators argue that truth and accuracy are
1 42
neither the goals 'nor the achievements of the judicial system.
Others simply claim that a lawyer's mission is to protect every legal
right his client has or may have, regardless of how technical or unsavory the origins of the right may seem. 4 3 The argument has been set
forth as follows: "Lawyers have to assert legal interests unsupported
by moral rights all the time; asserting legal interests is what they do,
and everyone can't be right on all the issues."'" If such is the case,
then professional courtesy, although desirable in some contexts, is not
138. The classic model would further dictate that when professional and moral obligations
conflict, moral obligation should take precedence. See Luban, supra note 14, at 118.
139. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
140. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex.
1988). This is a modified version of the often used quotation "justice delayed is justice
denied." See generally L. DOWNIE, JUSTICE DENIED (1971) (criticizing the long delays in the
judicial system).
141. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 14, at xix. Professor Dershowitz notes:
The courtroom oath-"to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth"-is applicable only to witnesses. Defense attorneys, prosecutors, and
judges don't take this oath-they couldn't! Indeed, it is fair to say the American
justice system is built on a foundation of not telling the whole truth.
Id.From a more scholarly perspective, Monroe Freedman remarks that "[t]he 'ordinary process of law'.., unquestionably includes the constitutional right to suppress relevant and truthful evidence that has been obtained in violation of constitutional rights-even though a wise
and informed judgment might thereby be sacrificed." M. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 32.
143. See infra note 150.
144. Luban, supra note 14, at 89.
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a legal obligation of a lawyer and should never intervene to override a
client's existing or potential legal rights. Supporters of the modem
model argue that because professional courtesy can have the effect of
undermining legal rights, litigants are better served where collegiality
is not available to foil the integrity and honor of loyal
145
representation.
Legal scholars continue to debate whether the most appropriate
vision of the adversary process is the modern, the classic, or some
other model.1 46 The answer, if indeed there is one, is beyond the scope
of this Comment. The focus here is on whether the legal profession
and society as a whole are better served by collegial lawyers. This
Comment has partially investigated this question, albeit from
polarized viewpoints. A better method of inquiry for the sake of
reaching a conclusion, however, may be to find some common ground
that unifies the opposing sides, rather than to focus on the differences
that polarize them.
For example, proponents of both the classic and the modern
models would presumably agree that the legal profession is currently
faced with a significant image crisis.147 The image problem can be
traced to a number of sources: cases decided on technicalities instead
of on the merits; lawyers who seem interested in promoting their own
interests over those of society or the profession; and the ever-increasing amount of time and expense required to gain access to our judicial
1 48
system.
The modem model, with its disdain for collegial behavior, seems
to present the image conscious with greater difficulties in this regard
than does the classic model. It is not likely that a legitimate dispute's
145. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
146. See generally Luban, supra note 14, at 83; Schneyer, Modern Philosophy's Standard
Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy,
1978 Wis. L. REV. 29. Perhaps Professor Schneyer described the situation best:
Whatever may be the case in other fields, legal ethics has no paradigm, only some
fragmentary conceptions of the lawyer's role vying inconclusively for
dominance-the lawyer as "hired gun," to be sure, but the lawyer also as "officer

of the court," "counsel for the situation," "friend," "minister," and so forth. As
a result the organized bar, for all its attention to ethics rules, has been able to do

very little "predetermining" of the individual lawyer's responsibilities, at least
when it comes to reconciling his duties to clients and to third parties.
Schneyer, supra, at 1569.
147. Every lawyer, regardless of ethical orientation, is currently experiencing a very low
approval rating from the public. The Committee on Professionalism recently reported that
only six percent of corporate users of legal services rated all or most lawyers as deserving to be

called "professionals"; only seven percent saw professionalism increasing among lawyers.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,

148. Id. at 251-54.

supra note 12, at 254 & n.22.
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obfuscation, occasioned by the gamesmanship of lawyers, will promote respect for the legal profession in the eyes of the lay public. 4 9 It
is much easier for the lay public to observe that the legal system failed
to punish a litigant who clearly committed a wrong, or failed to compensate the wronged party, than to appreciate and understand the
societal benefits that result from resolving a dispute in explicit accordance with the law.' 50 It is equally as convenient for the public to envision the lawyer as one interested more in personal gain than in any
5 1
more honorable purpose.'
In response, proponents of procedural justice would claim to be
answering to a higher calling by steadfastly protecting every legal
right a client may have."5 2 Arguably, even if the image of the legal
profession suffers, the integrity of the adversary process must be
maintained and protected from an "old boy" network that may exist
among opposing lawyers. This point deserves extra attention because
a serious image problem might also develop from the so-called "old
boy" network, if the public were to perceive overly collegial lawyers
as colluding and thereby undermining litigants' rights. 153 Indeed, just
149. Frankel argued that "[o]ur relatively low regard for truth-seeking is perhaps the chief
reason for the dubious esteem in which the legal profession is held." Frankel, supra note 30, at
1040. Moreover, "[public opinion data indicates] that lawyers are especially disliked because
they manipulate the legal system in the interests of particular clients, without regard to the
common, universal values of right and wrong." Post, On the PopularImage of the Lawyer:
Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 386 (1987).
150. One benefit that may be easy to understand is the idea that the American legal system
would rather let many of the guilty go free in order to assure that the innocent are not locked
up. See A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 14, at xviii.
151. The Committee on Professionalism reported that, in their opinion, many of the
problems with the poor professional image of the legal profession could be addressed by
subordinating a lawyer's drive to make money as a primary goal of practice. REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 12, at 300.

152. Charles Fried argues that "it is not only legally but also morally right that a lawyer
adopt as his dominant purpose the furthering of his client's interests-that it is right that a
professional put interests of his client above some idea, however valid, of the collective
interest." Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976). Another proponent of the modem model,
Monroe Freedman, states:
The client's interests are not only paramount to those of the lawyer, but are
superior to "the law's" long-range interests. In short, [it is wrong to assert] that
there is some "concern for history and institutions" that a lawyer must take into
account before advancing a claim on behalf of a client.
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 12.
153. See Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: OrganizationalCooption of
a Profession, I LAW & Soc'Y REV. 15 (1967). Blumberg, a sociologist, conducted a study of
the legal institution. In contrast to the hired guns which the legal profession currently
perceives, Blumberg saw the profession as inherently subject to collusion:
Close and continuing relations between the lawyer "regular" and his former
colleagues in the prosecutor's office generally overshadow the relationship

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:807

as a disdain for collegiality may hurt the lawyer's image, too much
collegiality will have a similar result. Consequently, any call for
increased collegiality must guard against this possibility. Supporters
of the modem model of advocacy can derive a sense of honor by pursuing what in their minds is the just course, but that course does not
address the low esteem that much of today's society holds for lawyers.
Even if the judicial process reaches justice more often in the absence
of collegiality, all members of the legal profession still suffer from the
backlash of a negative image. Yet, it is likely that a middle ground
could be reached where professional courtesy would be prevalent, litigators would refrain from Rambo tactics, and the public image of
lawyers would consequently improve.

54

At best, the image issue clouds the conflict between the classic
and modem views, both of which have strong ethical arguments. The
classic model makes an ethical issue out of resolving disputes upon
issues other than the merits, while the modem model makes an ethical
issue out of the lawyer's choice to abrogate clients' rights. Unfortubetween the regular and his client. The continuing colleagueship of supposedly
adversary counsel rests on real professional and organizational needs of a quid
pro quo, which goes beyond the limits of an accommodation or modus vivendi one
might ordinarily expect under the circumstances of an otherwise seemingly
adversarial relationship. Indeed, the adversary features which are manifest are
for the most part muted and exist even in their attenuated form largely for
external consumption. The principals, lawyer and assistant district attorney, rely
upon one another's cooperation for their continued professional existence, and so
bargaining between them tends to be "reasonable" rather than fierce.
Id. at 24.
Professor Schneyer recently characterized Blumberg's study as finding the following:
[D]efense lawyers are understandably tempted to sacrifice individual clients, or
even their clients as a class, in order to maintain good personal relations with the
prosecutors, police, and court and jail personnel with whom they must deal on a
long term basis. Moreover, they sometimes succumb to the temptation, foregoing meritorious defenses to avoid antagonizing busy prosecutors and judges, and
even acting as "double agents" for the criminal justice bureaucracy by advising
clients to cop pleas when it might not be in their interest and by "cooling out"
clients who fail at first to see the wisdom of the advice.
Schneyer, supra note 144, at 1544-45 (citation omitted).
Under this alternative, less prevalent characterization of the modern lawyer's motivations,
ethical codes do not demand collegiality because "the provisions ... serve largely as a corrective against indifferent advocacy by lawyers . . . whose personal interests-rather than
scruples-are stacked against clients." Id. at 1545; see also id. at 1546-47 (noting the absence
of hired guns and sharp practice in small communities).
154. Several factors point to the probable existence of such a middle ground. Although
public opinion has rarely favored lawyers, indications are that the image of the lawyer has
declined of late, as both Rambo litigation and disdain for the classic model of advocacy
increase. If these factors are even remotely related, a reasonable increase in collegiality and
professional courtesy could be tolerated before the negative implications of collusion take root.
Until such a threshold is reached, most commentators have argued that collegiality will benefit
lawyers and clients.
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nately, the image problem still remains in both cases. Although lawyers who do not regularly extend professional courtesies may in fact
be unconcerned with the damage done to the profession, more are
likely to claim that the justice due litigants is more important than the
profession's gross public approval rating. It may be true that the
strict application of procedural laws within a framework of zealous
advocacy creates fewer ethical problems than allowing lawyers to
determine which of their client's rights and requests are honorable.
The question of whether collegiality among lawyers improves the
quality of service to the public is clearly perplexing. It is at least arguable, however, that even if discourteous hired guns do provide better
services to the individual client, they are not helping the public image
of the legal profession.
Some jurisdictions have addressed the professional courtesy
problem by moving the dispute out of ethics and morality and into
black letter law. In Dondi PropertiesCorp. v. Commerce Savings and
Loan Association,1 55 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas responded decisively to two cases burdened by pretrial motions for sanctions concerning discovery abuse, misrepresentation of facts, and improper withholding of documents. 5 6 The court
convened en banc to establish standards of "litigation conduct" for
attorneys appearing in civil actions in the district. 57 The court
adopted eleven resolutions' 5 8 modeled after the Dallas Bar Association's recently ratified "Guidelines of Professional Courtesy" and
155. 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
156. Id. at 285.
157. Id. The court cited numerous reasons for taking such relatively severe action. See
supra note 2.
158. The court adopted the following resolutions:
(A) In fulfilling his or her primary duty to the client, a lawyer must be ever
conscious' of the broader duty to the judicial system that serves both
attorney and client.
(B) A lawyer owes, to the judiciary, candor, diligence, and utmost respect.
(C) A lawyer owes, to opposing counsel, a duty of courtesy and cooperation, the
observance of which is necessary for the efficient administration of our
system of justice and the respect of the public it serves.
(D) A lawyer unquestionably owes, to the administration of justice, the
fundamental duties of personal dignity and professional integrity.
(E) Lawyers should treat each other, the opposing party, the court, and
members of the court staff with courtesy and civility and conduct themselves
in a professional manner at all times.
(F) A client has no right to demand that counsel abuse the opposite party or
indulge in offensive conduct. A lawyer shall always treat adverse witnesses
and suitors with fairness and due consideration.
(G) In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may
exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer's
conduct, attitude, or demeanor towards opposing lawyers.
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"Lawyers Creed."' 59 Most of the resolutions feature mandatory language such as "a lawyer owes" or "a lawyer must," and all specifically
promote collegial behavior. For example, Resolution C states that
"[a] lawyer owes, to opposing counsel, a duty of courtesy and cooperation, the observance of which is necessary for the efficient administration of our system of justice and the respect of the public it
serves."'" Resolution F is directed at clients, stating that "[a] client
has no right to demand that counsel abuse the opposite party or
indulge in offensive conduct."'' These two provisions alone might
have prevented the disputes in Sprung'6 2 and Hardware Wholesalers.163 Unlike the aspirational provisions of the Model Code, or the
inapplicable Model Rules, the Dondi code uses explicit language
which the court pledged to enforce. 64 The court warned violators to
expect sanctions, including "a warm friendly discussion on the record,
a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education,
monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the
65
circumstances."
The adoption of strict codes of courtesy could provide an answer
to the conflict that collegiality inspires. A mandatory code could satisfy both sides of the collegiality dispute by transcending moral issues
and concentrating strictly on legal ones. Such a code of professional
courtesy would defuse any argument that posits that collegial behavior has the power to abrogate the legal rights of a litigant. Lawyers
would no longer be permitted to treat professional courtesy as an
(H) A lawyer should not use any form of discovery, or scheduling of discovery,

as a means of harassing opposing counsel or counsel's client.
(I) Lawyers will be punctual in communications with others and in honoring
scheduled appearances, and will recognize that neglect and tardiness are
demeaning to the lawyer and to the judicial system.
(J) If a fellow member of the Bar makes a just request for cooperation, or seeks
scheduling accommodation, a lawyer will not arbitrarily or unreasonably
withhold consent.
(K) Effective advocacy does not require antagonistic or obnoxious behavior and
members of the Bar will adhere to the higher standard of conduct which
judges, lawyers, clients, and the public may rightfully expect.
Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 287-88.
159. Item 2 in the Dallas Bar Association Lawyer's Creed reads as follows: "In all dealings
with fellow members of the Bar, I will be guided by a fundamental sense of integrity and fair
play; I know that effective advocacy does not mean hitting below the belt." Id.at 294.
160. Id.at 287.
161. Id. at 288.
162. Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1987); see supra notes 98-110
and accompanying text.
163. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc. v. Swope, 309 Pa. Super. 321, 455 A.2d 180 (1983); see
supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
164. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 288.
165. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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optional behavior that might weaken a litigant's position because a
position that could only be obtained through discourtesy would no
longer be a legally valid position. The supporters of procedural justice
would be satisfied because the procedures themselves would demand,
rather than request, courtesy. Similarly, hired guns would be precluded from using gamesmanship to fortify their clients' positions.
This "hybrid" model, blending the classic regard for decorum with
the modem preference for procedural exactitude, could yield some
important benefits. For example, if a code of courtesy brought collegiality back to the courtroom, trials would theoretically cost less
and reach more accurate results. In addition, the legal profession
could begin to address those aspects of the current image crisis that
are traceable to the demise of collegiality. The profession could begin
to regain lost esteem, and lawyers could begin to improve their
reputations.
This discussion, however, is largely theoretical. The first step
towards examining these hypotheses about the results of bringing collegiality back into prominence within the legal profession is to calm
the opposing factions of the collegiality dispute. Explicit codes of professional courtesy may be the answer if courts are willing to vigorously enforce them. Although the ultimate success of the Dondi code
must be judged over time, a few other jurisdictions have completed or
are currently considering codes of courtesy. 6 6 Whatever positive
effects codes of courtesy are able to generate, lawyers themselves must
realize that collegiality in and of itself is not an enemy. Up to the
threshold of the previously described "middle ground,"' 67 professional courtesies extended between lawyers advance the idea that legal
proceedings are fair. Such a realization will benefit the entire legal
profession, which is in fact what collegial behavior is meant to
accomplish.
166. In fact, in response to Dondi, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals have recently adopted the "Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for
Professionalism." See Texas Lawyer's Creed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1989, at Y27, col. 2; see also
Marcotte, Reining in Rambo, A.B.A. J.,
Nov., 1989, at 43. Under the Creed, lawyers shall
"not quarrel over matters of form or style, but ... will concentrate on matters of substance."
Texas Lawyer's Creed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1989, at Y27, col. 2. Furthermore, lawyers are to
advise clients "that civility and courtesy are expected and not a sign of weakness." Id. Other
cities and states that have adopted or are currently considering codes of courtesy include
Georgia, Kentucky, Los Angeles, New York, Cleveland, Nashville, and Little Rock. See
Samborn, supra note 2, at 22, col. 3. Smaller jurisdictions such as Dade County, Florida are
considering adopting similar codes. See Civility, Dade County B.A. Newsl., July 1, 1989.
167. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
VI.

[Vol. 44:807

CONCLUSION

Many of today's lawyers do not extend professional courtesies to
opposing counsel. The established legal community is dissatisfied
with this lack of professional courtesy for two major reasons: (1) a
lack of collegiality translates into fewer accurate outcomes on the
merits; and (2) a lack of collegiality tarnishes the image of the legal
profession. Scholars and judges alike have questioned the former postulate, but not the latter. The current codes of ethics do not provide a
cure. The ABA codes have urged collegiality since 1908, yet the
codes have never carried the power of enforcement necessary to
restrain those lawyers who must be discourteous. The codes have
lacked enforceability not so much because they are vague as to collegiality, but rather because they are based on a morality to which
every lawyer does not subscribe. In fact, judges interpreting the same
code differ as to when each provision should apply. 6 8 The proposed
solution to the problem is the promulgation of painfully explicit codes
of professional courtesy which impose specific duties of courtesy upon
attorneys. The legal obligation inherent in these codes may help to
resolve the moral dilemmas that trouble lawyers who believe that collegiality can undermine a litigant's tactical position. Regardless of
how lawyers currently perceive their duties to clients, public respect
for the judicial process remains low. If codes of professional courtesy
can work to bring collegiality back into prominence, the public may
begin to develop greater respect for each lawyer, and for the legal
profession as a whole.
ANDREW

R. HERRON

168. See, e.g., Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883, 890-93 (Mo. 1987)
(Rendlen, J., concurring); id. at 893-901 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).

